Social security for China's migrant workers - providing for old age by Watson, A.





Social security for China's migrant workers - providing for old age 
Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 2009; 38(4):85-115 
 
© Authors. The Journal of Current Chinese Affairs is an Open Access publication. It may be 
read, copied and distributed free of charge according to the conditions of the Creative 





















Authors who publish with this journal agree to the following terms:  
1. Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication in print and 
online. The work is distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivative 
Works License, which allows others to share the work with an acknowledgement of the 
work's authorship and initial publication in this journal. However, the work may not be 
altered or transformed. The license is valid for both electronic and paper copies. 
 
 
18 August 2015 
Journal of 






Watson, Andrew (2009), 
Social Security for China’s Migrant Workers – Providing for Old Age, in: Journal of 
Current Chinese Affairs, 38, 4, 85-115. 
ISSN: 1868-4874 (online), ISSN: 1868-1026 (print) 
 




GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Institute of Asian Studies  
in cooperation with the National Institute of Chinese Studies, White Rose East Asia 
Centre at the Universities of Leeds and Sheffield and Hamburg University Press. 
 
The Journal of Current Chinese Affairs is an Open Access publication.  
It may be read, copied and distributed free of charge according to the conditions of the 
Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.   
 
To subscribe to the print edition: <ias@giga-hamburg.de> 
For an e-mail alert please register at: <www.CurrentChineseAffairs.org> 
 
The Journal of Current Chinese Affairs is part of the GIGA Journal Family which includes: 
Africa Spectrum • Journal of Current Chinese Affairs • Journal of Current Southeast 
Asian Affairs • Journal of Politics in Latin America • <www.giga-journal-family.org> 
 
  Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 4/2009:  85-115   
 
Social Security for China’s Migrant 
Workers – Providing for Old Age 
Andrew Watson 
Abstract: The concept of “migrant workers” derives from the house-
hold registration system of China’s planned economy period. The con-
tinued existence of that system conflicts with the development of an 
integrated labour market. The current social security system, based on 
household registration and a large number of local pools, discriminates 
against migrant workers because of their mobility and the lack of mecha-
nisms to transfer benefits between pools. As a result, migrants have 
made major contributions to China’s economic development but do not 
get the same benefits as urban residents. Faced with this challenge, 
China’s government has begun to introduce policy reforms to improve 
social security for migrants. This article explores this development 
through a focus on old-age insurance. It analyses the special needs of 
migrants, the obstacles facing policy development and the proposed 
solutions. It argues that social justice and social equity require the devel-
opment of a system that treats all citizens equally, and that the logic of an 
integrated labour market will ultimately require a unified national system 
of old-age insurance. 
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Introduction 
The development of social security for migrant workers has become a 
priority for the Chinese government. A series of government policy an-
nouncements after 2003 addressed aspects of migrant employment, wel-
fare, education and training, and these developments culminated in the 
publication of the State Council Document No. 5, 2006, which provided 
a comprehensive review of all migrant-worker issues (State Council 
2006). The document acknowledged the major contributions made by 
migrants to rural development and to the economic and social transfor-
mation of China. It recognized the need to protect their rights and to 
improve their conditions. It called for an end to discrimination against 
them. Document No. 5 was thus a clear and unequivocal official declara-
tion that migrant workers should be seen as a group that needs policy 
support, rather than as a group to be excluded. Given the wide range of 
institutional and social barriers created by the dual economy policies of 
the plan era, however, these policy goals are more easily stated than real-
ized. The challenge is how to develop practical policies that match the 
mobility and characteristics of the migrants in a context where most 
social policy remains structured around place of household registration 
(hukou). Migrant workers are now the largest category of non-agricultural 
workers in China, yet because of their rural household registration and 
their geographical mobility they do not fit easily into urban social secur-
ity schemes based on place of residence and contributions to local social 
insurance pools (tongchou). Their rural household registration implies that 
they should return to their original home and rely on local provision. In 
essence, the issue is one of social equity and social justice, and it relates 
to the rights of all Chinese citizens to enjoy equal treatment and equal 
opportunity. 
The implementation of policies to extend social security and social 
insurance schemes to migrants is the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Human Resources and Social Security (MoHRSS), and experiments to 
provide work-injury and health insurance were launched by local social 
security bureaus in a number of cities and provinces during the late 
1990s. In recent years, local policies for old-age insurance for migrant 
workers have also been introduced. This study1 focuses on old-age in-
 
1 I am grateful to the Chinese and Australian experts involved in the project for their 
insights. However, the views expressed in this article are those of the author and 





                                                                                                        
surance provision for a number of reasons. First, unlike insurance for 
health, work injury, unemployment and maternity, all of which are de-
signed for short-term needs, old-age insurance is a long-term process 
that applies to everyone. It requires many years of contributions and 
accumulation and many years of benefit payment. System design, fund 
and database management, and prudential regulation are all complex 
issues. Analysing the way the schemes are structured and implemented 
illustrates the relationship between the demands of economic and social 
change and the reform of systems of governance. Second, the issue in-
volves conflicts of interest between urban and rural areas, between local 
communities and outsiders, between different regional governments and 
between different levels of government. The development of policy is 
thus contested, and the way the issues are resolved provides insights into 
the political economy of China’s reforms. Third, the macro-economic 
implications of old-age insurance policy choices are large. The govern-
ment will face substantial fiscal burdens, especially with an aging popula-
tion, if a viable scheme is not introduced now, while the migrants are 
largely young and able to contribute. Fourth, the nature and pace of 
urbanization and industrialization depends on the flow of labour be-
tween rural and urban areas and between economic sectors. As the la-
bour market becomes more integrated, this process will increasingly be 
shaped by how labour responds to relative wage levels and benefits. The 
choice of old-age insurance schemes has the potential to influence the 
outcomes. Finally, the role played by large old-age insurance funds in 
capital formation and investment has implications for the economy as a 
whole. All these issues are wide-ranging and demanding. The develop-
ment of old-age insurance for migrant workers is thus both an issue of 
social equity and of the nature of the Chinese development model. 
In what follows, I will first review the definition and nature of mi-
grant workers in China. I will then discuss the current social security 
system and the barriers facing migrant-worker participation in old-age 
insurance schemes. This will be followed by a review of the evolution of 
policy on old-age insurance for migrants and the current challenges fac-
ing policy development. I will conclude with some discussion of the 
implications of the issue for China’s development. 
 
not necessarily those of either the Australian or the Chinese government. I am also 
grateful to Jonathan Unger and three anonymous referees for their comments. 
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Migrant Workers and Their Characteristics 
Rural-to-urban migration began to emerge in China during the early 
1980s. In some ways, it was the inevitable consequence of the rural re-
forms introduced after 1978. These contracted land to household man-
agement, sanctioned the emergence of free markets in non-plan and 
surplus agricultural products, and gave farmers control of their own 
labour. These changes liberated farmers from the strict management of 
the collectives and from the controls over their geographical mobility. 
The farmers responded rapidly to the incentives to produce more profit-
able products for the free market and to direct their labour to activities 
with a higher value added, including off-farm and non-agricultural pro-
duction. This led not only to the growth of local township and village 
enterprises but also to the movement of rural labour into the cities. Both 
of these changes helped realize China’s comparative advantage in labour-
intensive manufactures and promoted the structural transformation of 
the economy. By the late 1980s, the rural migrants were already a signifi-
cant factor in the Chinese economy and major contributors to rural in-
comes and rural development (for an early discussion of the changes 
taking place during the 1980s and their economic implications, see Cai 
1990). 
Strictly speaking, the term “migrant workers” refers to people with 
rural household registrations who have moved to cities and towns in 
other areas to work. They may move permanently, for long periods or 
seasonally, and they may also circulate between provinces and between 
cities and their old home. Initially in China, they were called the “floating 
population” (liudong renkou). These definitions focus on household regis-
tration and are used to distinguish the migrants from the registered ur-
ban population of the areas to which they have moved.  
As the labour market has evolved and the population as a whole has 
become more mobile, however, these distinctions based on the old sys-
tems of population management have become harder to sustain. In cur-
rent usage, migrant workers in China are commonly called nongmingong, 
literally “farmer-workers”. They are rural people working outside of 
agriculture and dependent on their wages for their livelihood. They 
commonly retain links to the rural economy through their land contract, 
but they do not farm or only occasionally return to the farm during the 
busy season. This broad definition includes both migrants who move 
from rural to urban areas and those who move from agriculture into 
township and village enterprises, as well as those who move between the 





two categories. In some coastal cities, the term “outside worker” (wailai-
gong) has also become common, and it refers to any non-local, regardless 
of whether they came from the countryside or from other cities. Given 
the changes in labour mobility, the allocation of social welfare and social 
security provision (including education) according to household registra-
tion and the existence of local pooling arrangements (whereby social 
insurance contributions are pooled at the city or county level rather than 
at the national level) create major obstacles to the movement of labour 
and the integration of the labour market. In effect, economic growth and 
change have generated social transformations that in turn demand the 
reform of government processes. A system based on a planned economy 
and a sedentary population no longer corresponds to the realities of the 
economy. The division of employees into multiple categories (local ur-
ban worker, outside urban worker, farmer, rural migrant worker, town-
ship and village enterprise worker and so forth) and the structuring and 
management of social security provision according to category make the 
system very complex. Furthermore, because people are moving flexibly 
between places and categories, it is difficult to sustain. Ultimately, the 
social security system needs to provide similar coverage for all types of 
employees, both in terms of equity and in terms of simplicity of man-
agement.  
Given the migrants’ existence as highly mobile workers who change 
job and location frequently, the statistics on them are inevitably inconsis-
tent and uncertain. As can be expected, different statistical systems using 
different definitions arrive at different totals (for a helpful discussion of 
the statistical problems see Chan 2009). In 2006, for example, the Na-
tional Statistical Bureau (NSB) reported that rural-to-urban migrants 
totalled 132 million, while the Ministry of Agriculture reported 115 mil-
lion (Han 2009). The most recent NSB report at the end of 2008 gives 
140 million. When the township and village enterprise workforce of 85 
million is included, however, the total number of “farmer-workers” rises 
to over 225 million (NBS 2009). This total is similar to the Ministry of 
Agriculture estimate for the end of 2007 of 227 million, consisting of 126 
million migrants and 150 million township and village enterprise workers 
minus double counting (Xinhua Net 2008). Migrants (that is, “farmer-
workers”) can easily shift between migration to cities and working in 
rural enterprises, and the distinction between the two types of employ-
ment is primarily location. In developing social security for migrants, 
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therefore, the MoHRSS needs to cater for this larger figure. Both catego-
ries will need provision for their old age. 
Surveys of the rural-to-urban migrants have identified the following 
characteristics:2 
 They are roughly two-thirds male and one-third female, with some 
clear gender distinctions in the type of work undertaken. 
 The average age is around 29, and job opportunities decline after 
age 40. 
 Their employment tends to be in “dirty, arduous and dangerous” 
jobs. 
 They are increasingly among the better-educated farmers. Approxi-
mately two-thirds have junior secondary school education and a lit-
tle over 10 per cent are senior secondary graduates. 
 Some observers argue that approximately 20 per cent of them are 
settling permanently in urban areas. Some of these have technical or 
management roles and increasingly see themselves as urban. Ap-
proximately 60 per cent are more mobile. They spend most of the 
year outside the villages, but may return for festivals or busy peri-
ods. They move between employers and locations fairly regularly. 
Another 20 per cent are seasonal workers, who retain an important 
role as agricultural labour and only “migrate” during the slack agri-
cultural seasons. 
 Some studies also argue that generational changes have taken place 
in the nature of the migrants (Han 2009: 452-454). The first wave in 
the 1980s was essentially strong but unskilled rural labour, taking 
any work for more income than they could get farming, and many 
staying locally and retaining strong rural links. Subsequent waves 
have travelled further and become younger and more educated. 
Many of these depart for migrant jobs directly after graduating from 
school and have never worked on the farm and don’t want to. They 
see themselves as becoming urban. 
 There is also a trend for those who eventually return to their home 
counties or provinces to settle in local towns and to either set up 
 
2 There have been very many large and small surveys, each with variations in the 
ratios reported according to definitions and sampling. The figures cited here are es-
timates drawn from Hua 2009. They are cited as indicative references rather than as 
exact measures. Other useful surveys are reported in Cai and Bai 2006; Cui 2008; 
Cai and Du 2007; Han 2009: 449-465; Meng et al. forthcoming. 





small businesses or seek employment in local enterprises (Hua 
2009). 
Citing official statistics, Han Jun’s study reports that these rural-to-urban 
migrant workers have also become the largest proportion of the work-
force, making up some two-thirds of all non-agricultural workers, and 
that they have also become dominant in a number of major sectors as 
follows: 
Table 1: Rural-to-Urban Migrants as a Proportion of Total Workforce 
Industry Proportion of Total Workforce (per cent) 
Construction 90 
Mining and Extraction 80 
Textiles 60 
Urban Service Trades 50 
Source: Han 2009: 455. 
Han Jun also reports that in 2006 rural-to-urban migrant workers’ sec-
toral distribution was as follows: primary sector, 2.8 per cent; secondary 
sector, 56.7 per cent; and tertiary sector 40.5 per cent (Han 2009: 462). A 
large survey carried out by MoHRSS (then known as the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Security) in early 2007 also gave a more detailed 
breakdown of the migrant labour distribution across industries, with 
some major concentrations as follows: 
Table 2: Distribution of Migrant Workforce by Industry 
Industry Proportion of Total Migrants (per cent) 
Construction 16.3 
Electronics 13.5 
Textiles, Clothing, Foodwear 11.7 
Hotels and Catering 9.4 
Machinery Manufacturing 6.2 
Food Industry 4.9 
Transport 4.3 
Residential Services 4.0 
Source: Chen 2007: 5. 
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The regional distribution of these workers was reported as 70.1 per cent 
in the eastern region, 14.8 per cent in the central region and 14.9 per cent 
in the west (Han 2009: 463). The MoHRSS survey also provided a fur-
ther breakdown as follows: 
Table 3: Regional Distribution of Rural-to-Urban Migrants 
Place Proportion of Total Migrants (per cent) 
Own provincial capital 19.6 
Other cities within own province 21.6 
Pearl River Delta 20.9 
Yangzi River Delta 11.6 
Bohai area 11.9 
Southeast Fujian area (Min Dongnan 
Diqu) 7.6 
Other 6.8 
Source: Chen 2007: 4. 
Finally, the average length of time spent continuously outside their home 
by the migrants was 9.4 months (Chen 2007: 6). 
Despite their major role in total employment, the average monthly 
income of farmer-workers remains low and is well below the urban aver-
age. Furthermore, despite the fact that the economy and labour produc-
tivity grew rapidly, migrant wages remained almost static from the 1980s 
until the early 2000s (Li Deshui cited in Chan 2009, footnote 50. See also 
Li 2005). The labour-intensive development model thus relied heavily on 
maintaining the supply of cheap labour, and the existence of the house-
hold registration system helped sustain the low level of income and 
benefits for the migrants. In recent years – until the economic downturn 
in late 2008 – however, there were signs that the supply of rural labour, 
especially in the 16-35 age group, which was most in demand, was be-
ginning to dry up and this was leading to a rise in wages. Some, such as 
Cai Fang, had begun to argue that this heralded the imminent arrival of 
the Lewisian turning point (Cai and Du 2007). According to the National 
Rural Fixed-Point Survey, average migrant monthly wages in the period 
2003-2006 were as follows: 
 





Table 4: Average Migrant Monthly Wages 2003-2006 (CNY) 
Year Monthly Wage Males Females 
2003 781 855 632 
2004 802 883 649 
2005 855 934 704 
2006 953 1,048 711 
Source: Zhao and Wu 2007: 23-25. 
Furthermore, in 2006 over half of migrants earned below 800 CNY and 
one-third between 200 and 600 CNY. The MoHRSS survey, however, 
reported somewhat higher figures, with a 2006 average of 1,226 CNY 
and the largest proportion of 41.3 per cent in the 1,000-1,500 CNY level 
(Chen 2007: 7). While the wage data are inevitably uncertain, migrant 
remittances are a major source of rural livelihoods. According to one 
2005 study, they accounted for 20-50 per cent of the income of receiving 
households (Cheng and Xu 2005). A different study estimated a lower 
level at approximately 8.5 to 13.1 per cent (Du, Park, and Wang 2005). 
The China Statistical Yearbook 2006 (NBS 2006: 369) reports that “wage 
income”, which is defined as all off-farm income from paid labour and 
therefore would include migrant remittances, income from township and 
village enterprises and other earned income, accounted for approxi-
mately one-third of the per capita annual net income of rural households.  
A final important aspect is that, unlike urban residents’ incomes, 
which rise gradually over the employee’s employment life and peak to-
wards the end, migrants’ wages tend to rise to a peak early and then de-
cline over time, as the migrant’s physical strength declines (Zhang 2008). 
This fact has important implications for migrant expectations and their 
capacity to build assets for their old age. When they are young and their 
income is highest, their family and other needs tend to absorb their in-
come. As they age, they have fewer resources to prepare for retirement.  
In sum, the major characteristics of migrant workers are 
 relative youth; 
 high geographical and job mobility; 
 informal employment; 
 low income; 
 gender disparity in incomes, with females tending to have even 
lower incomes and even more informal employment; 
 an income structure that peaks early and tails off as they get older; 
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 a trend towards having better levels of education; and  
 a trend towards becoming more settled in cities. 
The design of social security programmes for migrants therefore needs 
to address these characteristics and to respond to the nature of the de-
mand that they create. With this in mind, we can now turn to examine 
the existing barriers to the development of migrant old-age insurance. 
China’s Social Security System and the Barriers 
Facing Migrants 
The preceding section has briefly examined the key characteristics of the 
migrant workforce. As I have stressed, there is an inherent contradiction 
between the emergence of a mobile and flexible labour force and a social 
security system that is structured around the administration of a seden-
tary population. The result is a set of barriers, some inherited and some 
new, that constrain migrant participation in old-age insurance schemes. 
Of these, the key ones are  
 the household registration system, 
 the nature of the Chinese social security system, 
 practical and technical barriers, 
 migrant preferences, and 
 the political economy of competing interests. 
The Household Registration System  
The most obvious barrier facing migrants is the household registration 
system (hukou) that has existed since the 1950s. As is well known, this 
system allocated all welfare and social service provision, including hous-
ing and education, through a citizen’s employment unit and registered 
place of residence. It reflected the priorities of a planned economy based 
on the bureaucratic allocation of resources for a relatively immobile and 
controlled population. It tied an individual to a location and created a 
nexus of interest between the local population and the local economy. 
Under the plan system, urban residents received welfare benefits from 
their employer or urban government agencies, while rural residents de-
pended on the local collective economy. The level of benefits was thus 
tied to the economic capacity of the workplace or the area. The eco-
nomic reforms swept aside the economic basis of this system. State en-





terprises declined, the private economy and market relations expanded, 
and the collectives disappeared. Nevertheless, the household registration 
system and the link to welfare provision remains.  
In the view of Chan, the effect of this system is to perpetuate low 
incomes for rural people by preventing them from becoming formal 
urban citizens and, thereby, excluding them from urban rights and bene-
fits (Chan 2009). The system thus stands in marked contradiction to the 
existence of a mobile population and to the needs of an integrated labour 
market.  
The Nature of the Chinese Social Security and Old-age 
Insurance System 
The reforms of the Chinese social security system during the period 
1991-1998 (Wang 2001; Wang 2002: 4-9; Zhao, Lai, and Wei 2006) in-
troduced insurance schemes for urban employees that provided coverage 
for health, work injury, unemployment, maternity and old age. This new 
structure replaced the old model of the plan period, whereby urban em-
ployees received social security and a defined-benefit old-age pension 
from their employer (Dixon 1981). It also brought the Chinese system 
closer to current market economy models for old-age income that in 
general tend to consist of three pillars:  
1. A basic pension that is funded from government revenue and acts 
as a minimum income for old people  
2. A compulsory individual account scheme that is funded by em-
ployer contributions alone or by employer and employee contribu-
tions over the working life of the individual  
3. A voluntary scheme whereby individuals also contribute to funds 
that are saved for their old age (OECD 2008; Hu and Stewart 2009) 
In China, urban schemes are developing rapidly, but rural schemes lag 
behind and provide a much lower level of benefits. The first pillar of a 
universal old-age pension provided from fiscal revenue does not exist. 
There is, however, a minimum income guarantee provided through the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs as a welfare payment for those who have no 
other sources of income. This is funded from fiscal revenue and is calcu-
lated according to family income. If a family’s per capita income is below 
the minimum, the supplement is paid. The system is most developed in 
urban areas, and it is still spreading into rural areas at a much lower level 
of payment. Furthermore, in September 2009, the State Council issued 
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Document 32, which announced the introduction of a new rural pension 
scheme that would include a substantial amount of fiscal subsidy along-
side farmer contributions (State Council 2009). The second pillar is the 
basic urban old-age insurance scheme managed by the MoHRSS through 
its subordinate public service unit, the Social Insurance Administration. 
Once again, rural schemes are still developing, and largely depend on the 
level of development of the local economy. The third pillar is left to 
individual choice and to the emerging system of enterprise annuity 
schemes. 
The development of this structure in China was in many ways inevi-
table, given the erosion of the socialist planned economy and the closure 
of state-owned enterprises. It also underlined the fact that the old de-
fined-benefit scheme was unsustainable, with some 20 to 30 per cent of 
state-enterprise wage costs being used to pay the pensions of the retired 
employees, no accumulated provision to fund pensions, and the ratio of 
pensions to wages increasing (Zhao, Lai, and Wei 2006: 46-50). The 
government could no longer guarantee a fixed percentage of an individ-
ual’s final wage as a pension, and it was necessary to look for ways to 
ensure that individuals could smooth income over time to provide for 
their old age and also build assets on which they could depend in later 
life. The aging population has highlighted the urgency of the change, 
given the growing number of people dependent on pensions and old-age 
insurance. 
China’s urban social insurance schemes depend on contributions 
from the employer and the employee. These are fixed as a percentage of 
the wage. Currently, employer contributions for urban employees for all 
types of insurance are set at approximately the equivalent of 43 per cent 
of the wage. The health, maternity, work-injury and unemployment ben-
efits are short term and relate to needs as they arise. The insurance is 
provided by employers for the period of employment, and the benefits 
are paid as required. By its nature, however, the old-age scheme is ongo-
ing over the lifetime of the individual members. It requires contributions 
to be recorded and accumulated in a fund, careful management of funds 
to preserve and improve value, secure systems to manage information 
databases over many decades, and a method for the payment of benefits. 
For each participant, the process might last up to 60 or more years, from 
the time of registration to the time of death.  
The design of the basic old-age insurance for urban workers in 
China is straightforward, though the implementation is complex (Xinhua 





                                                
Net 2005). Employers and employees contribute at a rate of 20 per cent 
and 8 per cent of the wage respectively. Individuals are able to retire after 
reaching the requisite age (55 for women and 60 for men) and, provided 
they have contributed to the local scheme for 15 years or more, they are 
eligible to register for a monthly pension that is meant to be at a re-
placement ratio of approximately 60 per cent of the local social average 
wage (that is, the average wage in the social pooling area and not the 
actual wage of the individual).3 As set out in the regulations, the policies 
for urban social security and old-age insurance are intended to cover all 
workers in urban employment, including migrants. Moreover, as dis-
cussed below, in places with large concentrations of migrants, such as 
Shenzhen and Dongguan, migrants are enrolled in the urban schemes. 
However, in operation the system has a number of special characteristics 
that add to its complexity and also act as barriers to the participation of 
migrant workers. 
First, the national scheme is not managed as a single integrated sys-
tem but as a set of parallel local pools (tongchou). Each pool is local and 
consists of the contributions from employers and employees. These are 
held at the local level and managed as a local fund. Each fund has its 
own specific features, and there is no single, standard national computer 
system used to manage them. The levels of contributions and benefits 
also vary. Although efforts are under way to raise the level of pooling, 
there are currently over 2,000 pools across China, and most of them are 
at county level. This means that the transfer of contributions and bene-
fits between cities and regions is complicated and difficult, even for ur-
ban residents. It is much more so for migrant workers, who might move 
between jobs and regions within a single year and certainly do so many 
times over the course of their working lifetime.  
Second, the pools also tend to be structured around the employer’s 
level of registration. Thus, the Guangdong Province Social Security Bu-
reau deals with the employees of enterprises registered at the provincial 
level, while the Guangzhou City Bureau deals with those of enterprises 
registered at the city level, and so on down through the system. The 
concept of locality thus combines the notions of both place and adminis-
trative level.  
 
3 It should be noted that employees in government agencies, public welfare units and 
similar institutions still receive the old planned-economy defined-benefits pensions 
and do not participate in these schemes. 
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Third, participation requires a formal employer who registers the 
employee in the scheme. After registration, the monthly contributions 
are calculated by the social security department and collected either 
through the tax office or through the social security agency, which places 
them in a special account. This account is operated through the fiscal 
offices and is meant to be subject to strict management rules in an effort 
to ensure the security of the funds. Self-employed urban people can also 
register and make contributions.  
Fourth, the contributions from employers and from individuals are 
treated differently. The employer contribution is seen as part of the 
common social pool (tongchou), and the individual contributions are seen 
as part of an individual account (geren zhanghu). Both are used to pay the 
final benefits, but they are recorded separately. The system is therefore 
not a pure individual account model. 
Fifth, when the system was introduced in 1996, no provision was 
made for existing retirees or for those approaching the end of their 
working life. These people are eligible for payments from the funds but 
have not made contributions over their working lifetime or have only 
contributed for a few years. In other words, the new scheme inherited 
large unfunded liabilities from the pre-existing system. Wang Dewen 
divides the scheme participants into three categories: the “old men” 
(those already retired in 1997 who continue to draw defined-benefit pen-
sions from the funds but have never made any contributions), the “new 
men” (those contributing to the new schemes from the beginning), and 
the “middle men” (those in mid-career who are part of the transition 
with some unfunded and some funded years) (Wang 2005: 7). The result 
is that there are many people with “empty accounts”, and the payment of 
benefits from the funds far exceeds the level of contributions. Most 
funds are in deficit and are supported from transfers from fiscal reve-
nues (Zhao, Lai, and Wei 2006: 55 report on the deficits between annual 
contributions and payments in 2001 for 10 provinces, with a range of  
15-28 per cent). In 2005, Wang Dewen quoted estimates that the na-
tional deficit was 2.5 trillion CNY and likely to grow to 6 trillion over the 
next 30 years (Wang 2005: 8). According to a 2009 newspaper report, the 
individual account part of the system had a deficit of 1.4 trillion CNY, 
despite having a contributing membership of 210 million people (Guo 





                                                
Jinhui 2009).4 Clearly, the existing schemes are currently not self-funded 
and will require substantial fiscal inputs for many years. 
This combination of local pools with no mechanisms for inter-
regional transfers, the lack of formal employment contracts for most 
migrants, the perception of enterprise contributions forming the basis 
for the local social pool, and the overall shortfall in fund accumulation 
vis-à-vis benefit payment obligations acts as a powerful barrier to the 
integration of migrants into the existing systems. Their job mobility, their 
frequent inter-regional movement and their employment in the informal 
sector make participation in the urban schemes complicated.  
In places where migrant workers are encouraged or allowed to join 
the urban schemes, the fact that they regularly change jobs or move be-
tween regions makes continuity in contributions difficult. The lack of 
compatibility between pools and the absence of mechanisms to transfer 
funds are major challenges. As a result, most pools with migrant partici-
pants allow them to withdraw their account when they move elsewhere. 
When they do so, however, the migrants can only withdraw their indi-
vidual contributions. They lose their claim on the employer’s social con-
tribution. In effect, retaining employer contributions made on behalf of 
migrant workers in the local pool is a way of improving the local balance 
and reducing the funding shortfall. This combination of a lack of transfer 
mechanisms and the importance of local interests means that there is 
little incentive to change the situation. Furthermore, it is difficult for 
migrants to guarantee that they will make 15 years’ worth of contribu-
tions to a single fund (including the required 5 consecutive years of con-
tributions in the final years of employment in some pool areas) and qual-
ify for a local retirement benefit. As a result, they have little motivation 
to participate, and they face the prospect of no old-age income in future. 
Given this situation and the challenge it presents for both social justice 
and social stability, it is not surprising that the development of a migrant-





4 While these various figures may all refer to slightly different ways of measuring the 
issue, the huge numbers underline the scale of the problem. Apart from these fore-
seen deficits, the risks from poor fund management or corruption add to the uncer-
tainties.  
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Practical and Technical Barriers 
As discussed above, an old-age insurance scheme requires keeping re-
cords over a period of up to 60 years or longer and well-structured man-
agement and database systems. Furthermore, contributions are made on 
a monthly basis and need to be recorded, fund values can fluctuate ac-
cording to investment income, and the payout of benefits also requires 
constant adjustment in the figures. Thus, the database must be continu-
ously active. Given the huge numbers of individuals involved, the tech-
nical requirements for database design, management and structure are 
demanding, and this requires significant investment in computer systems, 
information networking and such things as social security cards. As a 
consequence, the MoHRSS has been making substantial investments in 
technical and computerized systems for social security through its Jinbao 
Project (the MoHRSS website has a special section devoted to this pro-
ject, MoHRSS 2009a). In 1999, for example, it began to work on the 
introduction of social security cards, and by June 2008, social security 
cards were in use in 93 areas and approved for issue to 110 million peo-
ple (MoHRSS 2008). In developed areas such as Wuxi, people now have 
smart cards, and when they get medical treatment, they swipe their card 
for the insurance payment and only pay the gap amount from their own 
pocket. The Jinbao Project includes the development of computerized 
systems, networking platforms and access for individuals to consult their 
own records through the Internet. However, computer systems are not 
yet nationally standardized, links between regional databases are not 
possible, and some places still use paper records. The technical chal-
lenges are thus intensified by regional disparities and by variations in the 
capacity of local administrations to manage the social security system.  
As computer systems develop and the level of pooling rises, it be-
comes more possible for transfers to be made within the local city or 
province. Transfers across pools remain, however, very difficult. Even if 
a pool is willing to transfer funds to an outside entity, migrants going to 
a new area or returning to their home town might find that there is no 
local scheme into which the funds can be transferred and no mechanism 
for calculating the local value of the accrued benefits. 
In the absence of a national database – or a national network, na-
tional fund, and national tracking system – this technical environment 
creates major challenges for migrants who move between pool areas. 
Even if the regulations were amended to allow the transfer of both the 
social and individual funds, the complexities of transferring the funds 





between pools are obvious, as are the difficulties of keeping track of the 
individuals and their contributions to the system. These practical issues 
represent a significant barrier, and it is not surprising that in places where 
migrants are enrolled in the urban schemes, they are allowed to withdraw 
when they move.  
Migrant Preferences 
Apart from the barriers arising from the operation of the system itself, a 
further range of challenges arise from the lack of correspondence be-
tween the system and the migrants’ own preferences and expectations 
(Zhao, Lai, and Wei 2006: 313-314; interviews with researchers at the 
Rural Development Institute, CASS, August 19, 2008 and Han Jialing, 
August 22, 2009; He and Hua 2008). To begin with, the migrants are 
predominantly young and healthy and do not have a long-term perspec-
tive on their needs in old age. They are also not familiar with concepts of 
insurance against risk or of rights to a social security system. In addition, 
their income is low, they do not own many assets, and they are not will-
ing to sacrifice part of their wages to an unknown and uncertain scheme. 
For most of them, the key goals are to send money home to their family, 
to help build a new family house in their home village, and to prepare for 
their own wedding and family. They tend to assume that they will have 
to look after themselves when they are old. These attitudes are not sur-
prising, but as the migrants age, the need to consider their future income 
becomes more important. According to researchers at the Rural Devel-
opment Institute, approximately 20 per cent of the migrant workforce is 
aged 50 or older. The issue of their needs in old age is thus becoming 
increasingly important. Migrant priorities are, however, changing as the 
migrant generations evolve. Those who are settling in cities for longer 
and becoming more urban are increasingly aware of the need to consider 
their social security. Hua (2009) reports on a Ministry of Labour and 
Social Security study in 2005 which found that approximately one-third 
of migrants would be willing to participate in the urban schemes if they 
could. 
However, for many migrants, especially those with family members 
who have moved to the cities with them, urban housing may be more 
important than old-age insurance. Urban housing regulations and the 
nature of the housing market mean it is hard for them to get suitable 
cheap housing (Zhang and Ge 2007). Education for migrant children in 
cities is another priority. Another aspect is health. Their employment in 
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dirty and dangerous jobs and their long working hours put their health at 
risk. Many have to rely on informal medical treatment, but they tend to 
seek better treatment for their children. For female migrants maternity 
insurance is also an issue. Without it, they face a challenge to their work 
and health. They have to go back home to give birth, or they have to rely 
on cheaper and informal services.  
Given these priorities, it is important for the system design to re-
spond to needs in ways that both provide the services wanted and en-
courage greater willingness to participate. The high cost of employee 
direct contributions to urban old-age insurance (8 per cent of wages) is 
likely to be a disincentive. On the other hand, a lower contribution rate 
would mean a lower income in old age. For women, the issue is particu-
larly difficult. Apart from the fact that they are lower paid and are gener-
ally in the more informal employment sectors, they also tend to have 
more breaks from work for childbearing and family duties and are thus 
less able to make the regular contributions that are needed. The cost of 
old-age insurance is thus a significant issue facing all migrants, and espe-
cially women. 
Alongside these various competing priorities is the perception of 
risk. A commitment to long-term participation in old-age insurance 
schemes requires a sense of trust in the security of the funds and aware-
ness that the value of one’s benefits is being preserved and improved. 
This is true for both migrants and urban residents. If fund management 
is not stable and transparent, if people fear corruption and misuse of 
funds, and if there is a broad awareness that current contributions are 
being used to pay the pensions of the “old men” while there are deficits 
facing fund accumulation for the “new men”, then it is not surprising 
that migrants are suspicious. They will need to feel confident that all the 
contributions they are making are accumulating and that they have a 
growing stake in the system. Regular reporting on their account and 
reassurance about its growing value are needed to build such incentives. 
In the absence of such transparent reporting systems, it is understand-
able that migrants are not enthusiastic. If a compulsory scheme is used 
and they find that when they move they lose the employer contributions 
and can only withdraw their own funds, then they might well feel that 
they would get better value if they saved the money in the bank.  
Finally, given the wide range of local experiments and policies, mi-
grants face a range of old-age insurance choices, depending on their 
place of origin and the place to which they move. They may be in a posi-





tion to join local rural schemes in their home village, to enrol in local 
schemes for township and village employees, to enrol in a special scheme 
for migrants and to join the urban schemes. The current fragmentation 
of the schemes and the uncertainty about the differences in final out-
comes for each scheme makes a clear choice difficult. 
The above discussion is impressionistic. It does, however, underline 
that more analysis of migrant preferences and behaviour is needed if a 
successful set of social security policies is to be developed for them. The 
long-term nature of old-age insurance makes that requirement essential. 
The Political Economy 
The above sections have outlined a series of systemic and contextual 
challenges facing the development of old-age insurance for migrants. As 
the discussion has indicated, underlying these challenges are conflicts of 
interest that shape the way policy is developed and implemented. The 
main elements are 
 the ambivalent position of local governments, 
 conflicts of interest between employers and employees, 
 conflicts of interest between local residents and outsiders. 
Local governments are broadly keen to encourage the employment of 
migrant workers, since they promote the development of the local econ-
omy. These workers provide much of the labour for the construction of 
local infrastructure and housing, and they do work that local residents 
are unwilling to take on. There are also incentives for local governments 
to encourage migrants to join the existing urban schemes in terms of 
maximizing the local social pool for old-age insurance. The migrants are 
young and mobile. When they leave the area, they cannot take the em-
ployer social-pool contributions with them, and this can help fund the 
deficits in the schemes. Given these benefits, it is also likely that there 
would be concerns that introducing new schemes for migrants or ex-
panding participation in urban schemes would increase local production 
costs for enterprises because of the 20 per cent contribution rate for 
employers. This might have the negative effect of deterring investment 
and reducing local economic growth. In places heavily dependent on 
migrant labour, the need to attract migrants through social security pro-
vision may outweigh these concerns, but the issue is not straightforward.  
This focus on local economic priorities also illustrates the potential 
for conflicts of interest between different regional governments and 
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different levels of government. Governments in the poorer regions from 
which the migrants come have a legitimate concern that they might have 
to make provision for older migrants returning to their home areas, while 
the contributions made to social pools on their behalf remain in the areas 
in which they worked. Governments in the destination areas might take 
the position that they are unwilling to subsidize social security in distant 
areas not part of their local economy. Fiscal departments are concerned 
that they face risks in making provisions for old people with no old-age 
insurance accumulation of their own. The tensions between central gov-
ernment fiscal responsibilities and local government efforts to maximize 
local benefits may also play a role. Until some form of a national unified 
scheme for all forms of old-age insurance is developed, the potential for 
such frictions will always exist. 
For employers, as has been noted, paying social security contribu-
tions for migrants means an increase in costs, and many surveys report a 
tendency to under-report the number of migrant labour employees or to 
avoid reporting altogether. Furthermore, the constant movement of 
migrants means that employers continuously have to adjust the name list 
of migrant employees that they report to the social security bureaus each 
month. They thus have a strong incentive to avoid participation for their 
employees and to prefer schemes that have a lower contribution rate for 
migrants. It is also likely that preferences on this issue will vary between 
different types of employers and different sectors. 
Finally, there is also conflict between the interests of local residents 
and outsiders. As is common throughout the world, migrants are seen as 
poorly educated, “uncouth” and “low quality” (suzhi). In the minds of 
local residents, they are associated with social disorder and crime, with 
dirtiness, and with pressures on urban services and jobs. Their rural 
background and regional accents make them clearly distinguishable. The 
systemic discrimination of the household registration system is thus rein-
forced through social and cultural discrimination (Li 2004: 217-239; Lu 
2004: 306-337). Given this context, it is not surprising that local residents 
feel that the local social security pool belongs to the local economy and 
to them. They tend to resent the idea that the migrants might have a 
right to part of it and take it away.  
In sum, the development and implementation of social security 
schemes for migrant workers is a contested issue. While central policy 
promotes the goals of social equity for all citizens and the protection of 
migrant rights, the legacy of existing systems, the demands of local inter-





ests and the nature of social stratification combine to create obstacles to 
their realization, and they also ensure that the implementation of policy 
will be influenced by the way these conflicting forces play out. 
The Evolution of Policy for Migrant Old-age 
Insurance 
Faced with the many complex issues and challenges discussed in the 
preceding sections, many local governments have experimented with the 
provision of social security and old-age insurance for migrant workers 
since the 1990s (Hua 2009; Liu and Xu 2008: 221-227; Han 2009: 481-
482). Places like Dongguan in Guangdong, which is heavily reliant on 
migrant labour, began to allow migrants to participate in the urban 
schemes during the mid-1990s or even earlier (Interview, Dongguan 
Social Security Bureau, April 28, 2009). Other cities with large numbers 
of migrants, such as Wuxi, also began to allow migrants to join the urban 
schemes during the late 1990s (Interview, Wuxi Social Security Bureau, 
November 25, 2009). During the early years of the current decade, these 
experiments spread to places like Shanghai and other cities and prov-
inces, some of which began to introduce specially designed schemes for 
migrants. The early focus was on health and work-injury insurance, but 
gradually old-age insurance was introduced, either through participation 
in the urban schemes or through the design of specific programmes for 
migrants. Shanghai, for example, established a single integrated scheme 
to provide all five types of insurance for migrants which is separate from 
the urban resident insurance scheme. Employer contributions were set at 
a total of 12.5 per cent of wages. Furthermore, the old-age insurance was 
established by issuing annual certificates through the China Life Insur-
ance Company (Zhongguo Renshou). Once migrants accumulate 15 
years’ worth of certificates, they become eligible for an annuity paid from 
the insurance company. According to Hua Yingfang of the National 
Institute for Social Security under the MoHRSS, these new programmes 
fall into three main categories: 
1. Those that bring migrants into the urban schemes 
2. Those that set up special schemes for migrants 
3. Those that place migrants in rural schemes (Hua 2009) 
These experiments took place against the background of increasing em-
phasis on migrant issues by the Chinese leadership. A series of govern-
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ment policy documents after 2003 addressed migrant employment, wel-
fare, education and training. Then in 2006, Document No. 5 provided a 
comprehensive review of all migrant problems and declared the central 
government’s commitment to help solve them (State Council 2006). In 
respect of old-age insurance, this document set out the basic principles 
for policy development (article 19): 
Explore a scheme for old-age insurance that suits the characteristics of migrant 
workers. Focus research on a migrant worker old-age insurance scheme 
that has a low rate of contributions, broad coverage, is transferable, 
and can link to existing old-age insurance systems. Where conditions 
are suitable, migrant workers in stable employment can be brought di-
rectly into the basic old-age insurance for urban employees. Employ-
ers of migrants already participating in urban schemes should con-
tinue to pay contributions for them. The Labour and Social Security 
Departments must urgently determine methods for transferring and 
linking migrant worker old-age insurance across regions.  
After Document No. 5 was issued, migrants were increasingly seen as a 
group that needed policy support, rather than a group to be excluded 
from local social welfare services. The problem, however, has been how 
to develop policies in practice that match their particular characteristics. 
As discussed above, the key challenges are as follows: 
 Job mobility: migrants regularly change their employment. This 
requires constant registering and re-registering by employers. 
 Regional mobility: migrants move frequently between provinces and 
cities and also between local rural enterprises in their home province 
and enterprises in other regions. 
 Migrants are more likely to find informal employment than work 
with a formal employment contract. 
 Female migrants tend to have greater job mobility, greater levels of 
informal employment, and more inconsistent employment records 
because of child-rearing and family responsibilities. 
 Migrants lack incentives and faith in the long-term benefits they are 
supposed to receive from existing schemes and are therefore not 
willing to contribute or withdraw when they move. 
 Employers are often unwilling to accept the higher labour costs of 
paying contributions to migrant workers’ old-age insurance. 
 Migrants’ income levels are low and the costs of participating in 
urban schemes are high. 





 Migrants find it difficult to fulfil the contribution requirements of 
existing urban schemes, such as contributing for 15 years and, in 
some places, making continuous local contributions for the final 5 
years of employment. 
 Designing schemes to match these features requires flexible and 
accurate information management systems to cater for frequent 
movement and changes, and mechanisms to ensure that fund con-
tributions are preserved in the various pools, combined together and 
transferred to the place of final residence when the individual retires 
and starts to draw retirement benefits. 
Drawing on the lessons of the various local experiments in dealing with 
these issues, the MoHRSS drafted a procedure for migrant-worker par-
ticipation in basic old-age insurance during 2008 (Nongmingong canjia jiben 
yanglao baoxian banfa) and in February 2009 issued a discussion draft for 
public comment (MoHRSS 2009b). The draft was made available for 
public comment until July 2009, with the goal of revising it to a final 
version during the second half of the year. At the same time, since the 
issue of portability applies not only to migrants but also to workers mov-
ing between cities, the ministry also addressed the issue of the transfer of 
social insurance registration for urban workers with a draft temporary 
procedure for the transfer of basic old-age insurance registration for 
urban enterprise employees (Chengzhen qiye zhigong jiben yanglao baoxian 
guanxi zhuanyi jiexu zhanxing banfa). This was also made available for pub-
lic comment. In June 2009 Vice-Minister Hu Xiaoyi of MoHRSS re-
ported that many comments had been received and that, while much 
complex technical work needed to be done on the implementation pro-
cedures, he anticipated that final revised drafts would be issued by the 
end of the year (Hu 2009). 
The discussion draft put forward the following main policy princi-
ples: 
1. The procedures would be compulsory and apply to all migrants in 
urban employment with formal contracts. 
2. The contribution rate would be an amount equivalent to 12 per cent 
of the wage for the employers and between 4 and 8 per cent for the 
migrant worker (according to the individual’s preference). Employer 
contributions would go to the social pool, and individual contribu-
tions would go to the individual account. 
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3. Migrants already enrolled in urban schemes would be allowed to 
adjust their contribution rates to the new levels if they wished. 
4. Withdrawals would not be allowed when migrants changed jobs. 
Instead the migrants would be issued with a contribution certificate 
by the local social security agency. They would then rejoin the 
scheme in their new place of employment and present the certificate 
issued by the previous agency. The two social security agencies 
would complete the transfer of the registration, and the new contri-
butions to the scheme would accumulate in the new fund. The 
funds and records of those who did not go to new employment 
would be sealed in their original place of employment. Interest 
would continue to accumulate in the sealed fund according to the 
national regulations. 
5. After 15 or more years of contributions, the migrant would qualify 
for benefits. The migrant would apply to the social insurance agency 
at their place of final employment, which would verify and issue the 
retirement benefit, including both the social pool and the individual 
contribution. This would require the design of arrangements to 
transfer funds from the earlier social pools to the final one. Those 
not completing 15 years might have their benefits transferred to a 
rural scheme or might make a lump-sum withdrawal of their indi-
vidual contributions. 
6. A unified national information database for old-age insurance con-
tributions by migrants would be established and a lifetime national 
social insurance card would be issued, bearing a specific identity 
card number. The migrants would have access to their insurance 
contribution record from any social insurance office. 
The ministry’s replies to reporters’ questions at the time the draft was 
issued underlined that these regulations were aiming to improve migrant 
participation in old-age insurance. At the time, approximately 24 million 
migrants out of 219 million people were insured in the urban scheme 
(approximately 17 per cent). It was also indicated that, despite the lower 
contribution rates, the end retirement benefits would be the same (Guo 
Huijun 2009). 
In sum, the basic outline of the proposed new scheme required (1) 
compulsory participation with no withdrawals, (2) the reduction of the 
entry threshold for migrants, (3) the maintenance of sealed accounts in 
local pools when migrants move, (4) the establishment of a national 
database for migrant records, and (5) a mechanism for pooling lifetime 





contributions at the place of final residence. While these proposals were 
straightforward, they required substantial adjustments to the existing 
local practices and also the development of new standardized national 
procedures for fund and database management. Given the large varia-
tions currently existing between local regional schemes, the implementa-
tion of the new policy thus faced a number of challenges and risks. 
These included 
 the potential for continued discrimination against migrant workers 
by consolidating their status through a distinct old-age insurance 
system, 
 the risk of undermining the rights of migrant workers already in 
stable employment and participating in urban schemes who now 
consider themselves urbanized and do not want to change, 
 the need to manage the transition from existing schemes for mi-
grants in ways that do not dismantle established rights, 
 the possibility that establishing two levels of contributions would 
potentially encourage employers to favour cheaper migrant labour 
and create discrimination against urban employees, 
 the development of transparent and reliable management and in-
formation systems that provide clear incentives for migrant workers 
to join, 
 the development of fund management and fund security in ways 
that ensure that contributions both preserve and increase value, 
 the complexity of fund control and account management problems 
if each migrant worker’s contributions are dispersed among local 
pools, 
 the need to establish a national, standardized information database 
system which can handle large amounts of data at a unified national 
level. 
The creation of a separate structure for migrant workers with different 
contribution standards from other schemes also risked creating obstacles 
to the long-term goal of unifying the national system. While the devel-
opment of a national migrant-worker system might provide lessons for 
the integration of a national scheme, it would also result in the parallel 
existence of urban, rural and migrant schemes (and in some places even 
township and village worker schemes as well).  
Even as this draft procedure was under review, however, the con-
text for policy development was further complicated by the State Coun-
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cil’s Document 32 2009, the announcement of a proposed new old-age 
pension scheme for rural residents (State Council 2009). This scheme is 
intended to provide a monthly payment of 55 CNY to rural residents 
over the age of 60. Funding for the scheme would come from central 
and local government subsidies and farmer contributions. It is intended 
that experiments will begin in up to 10 per cent of counties starting in 
late 2009 and that the scheme will become universal by 2020. The publi-
cation of this new plan immediately raised a further challenge for the 
proposed migrant-worker old-age insurance scheme, since migrants 
might regularly move between rural and urban employment and might 
also have the choice of belonging to either scheme. Furthermore, if they 
eventually decide to return to rural areas in their retirement, there would 
be new issues in determining how their urban-based insurance might 
relate to the proposed rural system. Given this new situation, it is likely 
that the draft procedure will require further refinement. 
Whatever the outcome, the successful refinement of the current 
policy proposal will require flexibility in responding to transitional prob-
lems and openness so that it can promote the evolution of diverse local 
schemes towards a unified national structure. Ultimately, the demands of 
a unified labour market require a unified social security system, and the 
demands of social equity and social justice require that all citizens should 
have equal access to the same basic structure, with differences depending 
on their capacity to contribute over their working lifetime. 
Conclusion: The Implications 
This essay has explored the issues facing the development of social se-
curity for migrant workers in China through an analysis of the develop-
ment of the old-age insurance scheme. It has discussed the definition 
and nature of migrant workers in Chinese society and identified their key 
characteristics in relation to old-age insurance. It has examined the barri-
ers facing the development of their social welfare, and it has described 
how the evolution of policy requires grappling with the many complex 
issues involved. In this concluding section, I will briefly address the im-
plications of this analysis for China’s development. 
The first point to note is how the nature of economic and social de-
velopment in China is leading to policy changes that closely parallel the 
types of policies adopted in market economies. The combination of an 
aging population, a flexible and mobile labour force, and the need to 





encourage citizens to prepare for their own old age in order to reduce 
future fiscal liabilities is a global issue. In economic terms, this means 
finding ways to promote income smoothing so that people defer some 
of their current income for future use and asset building, thus accruing 
assets that they can use in their retirement. The informalization of em-
ployment adds a further dimension to this challenge by placing a large 
proportion of the workforce outside employer-based social security pro-
vision. This is also a major feature of other Asian economies such as 
Indonesia and India. Like China, they have large migrant-worker popula-
tions employed in the informal sector and do not have a social security 
system to serve these workers’ needs. In China, the contribution of the 
migrants to China’s economic growth has been substantial and recog-
nized. If China’s current experiments do lead to the development of a 
viable scheme for migrants, the lessons for other countries in the region 
could be important.  
At the same time, the macro-economic implications of these devel-
opments are very significant. Apart from the potential fiscal burden that 
will be faced if a workable scheme is not developed, the incentive effects 
of scheme design and the way the insurance funds are managed will have 
important implications for both labour and capital flows. As the labour 
market develops, the nature of social insurance will potentially have a 
growing impact on the way labour flows between sectors. From the 
point of view of labour, there will be incentives to move to areas or 
schemes with the best outcomes. From the point of view of employers, 
there will be incentives to reduce costs by finding ways to limit social 
insurance contributions. The way the tax system treats the contributions 
will also play a role. Alongside these effects, the development of large 
funds needing to be invested in ways that preserve and increase value 
will also affect the structure and operation of capital markets.  
Finally, it is clear that the issue is a contested one, with conflicts be-
tween different sets of social interests. The way the policies are debated 
and implemented reflects both the relative influence of different social 
groups and the way the government responds to those pressures in the 
face of social policy needs. As has been illustrated, the process thus pro-
vides insights into the political economy of China’s reforms. At the same 
time, this analysis has underlined how economic and social change de-
mands further changes in governance. The social security needs of mi-
grants require a change in the way policy is designed and implemented. If 
the issue is not addressed, social and economic stability could be threat-
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ened. The design of an effective policy with the appropriate incentives 
will, however, require greater transparency and accountability if it is to 
work. It will also require coordinated reforms to the household registra-
tion system and to the fiscal system. The issue is becoming urgent, and 
the way the changes evolve will cast light on the capacity of the Chinese 
governance system to adapt and to respond to fundamental issues of 
social equity and social justice. 
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